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Summary findings
Van de Walle examines how rural road investment  The selection formula she proposes aims to identify
projects should be selected and appraised when the  places where poverty and economic potential are high
objective is poverty reduction.  and access is low. She illustrates the method using data
After critically reviewing past and current practices,  for and project experience in Vietnam.
van de Walle develops an operational approach  Among the advantages of proceeding as outlined in her
grounded in a public economics framework in which  proposal: This approach holds the hope of building
concerns of equity and efficiency are inseparable,  capacity and is participatory; it extracts local information
information is incomplete in important ways, and  that may not be readily available to the central
resources are limited. She addresses a key problem: that  government; and it appears to be feasible because it relies
an important share of the benefits to the poor from rural  on local authorities participating in the appraisal of
roads cannot be measured in monetary terms.  subprojects.
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It is widely  agreed  that the economic  appraisal  of development  projects should  help
select  the projects  that contribute  most to social  welfare.  The chosen  projects  should yield
larger gains in social  welfare  than alternatives.  Put in such  general  terms,  the objective  is clear
enough. But its implementation,  and particularly  how to measure  net benefits,  is rarely so
clear. This  paper focuses  exclusively  on the appraisal  and selection  of investment  projects in
the rural roads sector, where  the specific  objective  is taken to be poverty  reduction.  This is
broadly  defined  to include  relevant  non-income  dimensions  of welfare.  How one might go
about choosing  between  road investments  is discussed  in general  terms  with some specific
illustrations  from current work in Viet Nam.
The proposed approach  is summarized  in Box 1. The proposal  recognizes  explicitly
that an important  problem  for some types of public  spending,  including  rural roads, is that
there is a sizable  share of the benefits  that cannot  be measured  in monetary  terms so as to be
aggregated  consistently  with monetary  measures  of other  benefits  and costs. However,
research  should  at least be able  to provide  an assessment  for a few selected  cases, which  can
provide  a benchmark.  And there are participatory  methods  for tapping  local  information  to
form  judgements  of the relative  importance  of different  types of benefits  in the specific  setting.
The proposal in Box 1 tries  to use the infornation available  to form a second  best appraisal
method,  taking account of the informational  constraints  faced  in practice.
In the following  sections,  the paper argues that a change  in the transport  sector's
current approach  to rural  road investment  selection  is warranted  along  the lines  described
here,  building  on some of the poverty-focused  "hybrid" methods  found in recent rural road
appraisals  at the World  Bank and elsewhere.
lBox 1: An appraisal method for rural roads when data are incomplete
A minimum  monetary  rate of return is required for rural  road investments  as
a whole, though recognizing  explicitly  that there are potentially  important  benefits  to
which monetary  values  cannot  be assigned. Research  from other settings  is used to
set a benchmark  value for the share of benefits  from a project that is measured  in
monetary  terms. For example,  if research  suggests  that only two-thirds  of the
benefits  are being  captured in the existing  cost-benefit  calculations  and the overall
minimum  rate of return is 12 percent (when all  benefits  are monetary  and observed)
then  the minimum  monetary  rate of return on rural roads is 8 percent. The
benchmark  is given  for each  project, though it may  be revised  in the light of new
research.
An initial  budget  is set, though this may  have to be revised  in the light of the
subsequent  appraisal.  The budget  is to be allocated  between  many  competing  road
investments.  An index  of the benefits  from a given  road link  investment  is decided
on as a weighted  mean  of various  measurable  but indicators,  with weights  reflecting
both the expected  benefits  and how poor the beneficiaries  are. The aim  is to be
comprehensive  in identifying  benefits,  and not to confine  attention  solely  to
pecuniary  benefits.  A participatory,  focus group, method is used to determine  the
weights  on different  indicators.
AUl  subprojects  are then ranked  by the ratio of the comprehensive  benefit
index  to their cost. Subprojects  are picked with the highest  ratios  until the initial
budget  is exhausted.
To assess whether  the initial  budget allocation  was too high or too low, the
monetary  rate of return  calculation  comes into play.  The narrowly  defined  monetary
benefits  are estimated  for a random  sample  of the subprojects  selected  according  to
their (comprehensive)  benefit-to-cost  ratio.
If, given  the initial  budget,  the set of selected  projects achieve  the pre-
determined  minimum  monetary  rate of return  then that budget is the final  budget. If
the monetary  return is above  (below)  the minimum  then  the budget  is increased
(decreased)  and subprojects  are added (deleted)  according  to their comprehensive
benefit  measure.
For example,  if an extra  budget allocation  to the sector  appears  warranted
then a fixed  increment  is set, and one picks the sub-project  with the next highest
benefit-to-cost  ratio, and so on until the increment  is absorbed. If the minimum
monetary  rate of return is achieved  for a sample  of the newly  selected  sub-projects
then the process stops;  if not it continues,  adding  or deleting  subprojects  as
required.
2The paper first critically  reviews  the methods  typically  used for selecting  roads in
Bank-financed  projects,  both conventional  cost-benefit  analysis  (section  2) and the more
recent hybrid  methods  which  combine  cost-benefit  methods  for some projects  with cost-
effectiveness  calculations  for others (section  3). Section  4 discusses  efforts  at quantifying
typically  excluded  benefits. This is followed,  in section 5, by an examination  of the relevance
of the traditional  approach  in the context of a poor rural  economy,  using  Viet Narn  to
illustrate  the points mnade.  The  paper then  proposes  an alternative  approach. Section  6 sets
out the problem  to be solved.  Section  7 presents  the proposed  methodology  and section  8
uses Viet Nam survey  data to test the approach's  underlying  assumption.  The paper  ends
with some concluding  comments.
2.  Traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis of Roads
There is some  research  on the importance  of infrastructure,  and in particular  road
infrastructure,  to agricultural  output, economic  growth  and poverty  reduction  (including
Antle 1983;  Binswanger  et al. 1993;  Chhibber  1989;  Jalan  and Ravallion  1998;  Fan et al.,
1999).  For example,  Jalan  and Ravallion  (1998) find that road density  was one of the
significant  determinants  of household-level  prospects  of escaping  poverty  in rural China.
However,  it is far from clear that existing  methods  of project appraisal  for rural  roads will
properly  reflect  the potential  benefits  to the poor.
Cost-benefit  analysis  methods  for appraising  investments  in the road infrastructure
sector  were first developed  for roads in more  urbanized,  high-traffic  density  areas, drawing  on
methods  from a developed  country  literature  on road appraisal. Traditionally,  road
investments  in World Bank financed  projects  have been  selected  based on benefit  indicators
3derived  from consumer  surplus  calculations  of road user savings,  comprising  both of vehicle
operating  cost savings  and  journey  time savings. Forecasts  of traffic  demand-reflecting both
normal  growth in traffic and that generated  by the project-are  used to derive  willingness  to
pay estimates  to proxy project  benefits. Over time, the approach  has been  implemented  at
different  levels  of sophistication,  anywhere  from  only considering  benefits  accruing  to
motorized  four-wheel  vehicles  to also including  gains  to non-motorized  traffic  and pedestrians
based  on reduction  of travel  time savings. In some cases, estimates  of the value of
agricultural  production  increases  induced  by the road investment  are also included.' The
appraisals  have  generally  not made distinctions  between  beneficiaries  from  different  income  or
other socioeconomic  groups.
A number  of criticisms  have  been  leveled  at this approach  (Hine 1982,  Gannon  and
Liu 1997).  One is that it tends to bias investments  towards richer  areas since  the demand  for
traffic  and hence,  willingness  to pay measures,  are higher  for the rich. Another  is that it is
appropriate  for high, but not for low traffic areas;  and relatedly,  that it fails  to capture some
important,  but hard to quantify,  benefits  from  road investments.  For these reasons,  some
observers  argued  that the method  led to under-investment  in rural roads and in particular,
rural roads serving  poorer populations. There  are projects  that, by conventional  cost-benefit
analysis,  do not have an internal  rate of return greater than  the critical  level  (typically  set at 12
percent), but yet yield  higher  social  welfare  gains  than the projects that do pass the test.
In the late seventies,  a number  of papers inside  the World  Bank argued  for replacing,
or supplementing,  consumer  surplus  measures  with producer  surplus  benefit  measures  for
roads where traffic  levels  are low (see Carnemark  et al. 1976,  and Beenhakker  and Chammari
iHine  (1982) provides a good discussion  of the most commonly  used methods of estimating  benefits.
41979).  The case for a change  in focus  rested on the induced  agricultural  developmental
impacts  of roads not captured  by traffic  cost savings  when  traffic  is low. Producer  surplus
estimates  aimed  to capture gains  in agricultural  incomes  resulting  from transport
improvements  and concornitantly  higher  farm-gate,  and lower input,  prices. The aim  was to
prevent  biases caused  by sole emphasis  on consumer  cost savings  in predominantly
agricultural  areas.  Complementary  agricultural  development  programs  were also emphasized
in order to maximize  road investment  returns (Beenhakker  and Chammari  1979).
However,  CB analysis  as currently  practiced  in the transport sector  is still  riddled  with
problems  in how benefits  are measured.  Valuing  benefits  for non-market  goods for which
prices are not known  and the consumption  of which  is subject  to quantity  constraints  is
difficult  (Comes 1995).  One problem  is that there is lack of agreement  on the social  welfare
function  that one ultimately  bases these  valuation  judgements  on. Conventional  CB analysis
does not unambiguously  answer  the question  of how much  should  be spent on rural roads. A
fundamental  source of the ambiguity  has to do with the weights  people attach  to the multiple
objectives  of policy. Of course, the road and transport sectors  do not face any peculiar
problems  here. These  issues  are shared throughout  public  finance  and public  policy.
The main  problems  in conventional  methods  relate  to the systematic  exclusion  of
certain  benefits,  faulty  measurement  of the included  benefits,  and failure  to recognize  that the
assumptions  needed  to justify  ignoring  distributional  impacts-and so focus solely  on
efficiency  gainso  not hold in practice.
Excluded benefits:  Conventional  appraisal  methods,  even when  combining  consumer
and producer  surplus,  are still  likely  to result  in the under-funding  of rural roads. Some key
benefits  such  as those accruing  to individuals  and to society  from increased  attendance  to
5schools, health  and other facilities  rendered  accessible  by the road investments  continue to be
omitted. Accompanying  distributional  benefits  are also ignored.  Furthermore,  there may  well
be large but omitted  risk insurance  benefits  from linking  isolated  poorer populations  to
national  transport  and communication  networks.  Quantification  of all these benefits  remains
largely  intractable.  These  ornitted  benefits  would  be of less concern  if it could  be argued  that
they are positively  correlated  with the included  benefits.  However,  that is not plausible.  Rural
roads may well  have high  omitted  benefits  but low included  benefits.  Ranking  road investment
options in terms of observable  benefits  may  be only weakly  correlated  with the ranking  in
terms of total benefit.  It appears  to be unlikely  that conventional  methods  are a reliable  guide
to project selection.
Included  benefits: Current  methods  of estimating  the included  benefits  are also
questionable. Both consumer  and producer  surplus  are problematic  as currently  measured.
Typical  consumer  surplus  calculations  for roads tend to exclude  consumer  gains from changes
occasioned  by the road in non-transport  goods prices.  Average  daily  traffic  measures
frequently  used in forecasting  benefits  are hard to predict. Similarly,  producer surplus
measures  tend to be incomplete  and arbitrary  in what is included.  Why  focus solely  on farmers
and agricultural  produced  surplus? Impacts  on non-farm  employment  and other income
earning  opportunities  are typically  not factored  in. Producer surplus  measures  also often rely
on the same  supply  response  parameters  across  regions, on spotty production  data and make
use of averages  across  income  groups  not allowing  for household  and geographic  specific
factors that influence  marginal  benefits  (van de Walle  and Gunewardena  2000).
Distributional  weights:  The use of distributional  weights  to counter  biases against
poor areas  has tended  to be frowned  upon within  the sector (Gannon  and Liu 1997). As
6Gannon  and Liu state "Economic  efficiency  is widely  accepted  as the primary  objective  of
transport  sector operations  and is used, through  cost-benefit  analysis,  to guide  project
selection  and design"  (p. 23). They  argue that distributional  concerns  should  be handled  at
the macro-economic  level  such as directly  through the tax system  and, that income
distribution  decisions  are essentially  a political  responsibility.  They  also feel  that "use of
distributional  weights  is, by and large  not appropriate"  since  they "are subjective,  vulnerable
to misinterpretation  and open to manipulation"  (Gannon  and Liu 1997,  p. 26).
The argument  that the transport  sector should  be geared  to maximize  efficiency  is
based on a first best model  of the economy:  Go for efficiency  in production  and use
redistributive  instruments  such as the tax system  and lump  sum  transfers  to achieve  the
redistribution  objective.  There are two problems  with this view. First, the objective  can be
questioned,  and second, its implementation  in practice.  The key assumption  underlying  the
"maximize  efficiency"  view  is that there are other instruments  available  for meeting  the equity
objective,  so that some sectors such as transport  can be left  to deal solely  with efficiency.
Given  incomplete  markets  and limitations  on instruments,  this assumption  fails  to hold in
practice. If one cannot establish  that there already  exist  the instruments  needed for
redistribution,  and that markets  work well,  then the maximize  efficiency  objective  becomes
unsupportable  when equity  is valued.
Second, even  if we agree  that efficiency  is the objective  of transport  investments,
benefits  must still  be measured  properly  and thoroughly. Otherwise,  it is entirely  possible  that
the efficiency  objective  is not in actual  fact being  met. It can be persuasively  argued  that
benefits  are typically  not being  thoroughly  measured. Indeed,  as discussed  above,  the
measurement  of benefits  has tended to emphasize  benefits  to the better off and omit those that
7favor the poor. In the end, the benefits  that one cannot  measure  appear  to be precisely  those
that accrue to the poor, so achieving  the partial  efficiency  objective  may  well  bias investments
against  the poor.
Hence  in both cases, the bias goes against  projects  that might  directly  favor the poor.
3.  Poverty-Focused  Hybrid  Methods
Transport  sector experts  typically  do not make  the decisions  about  how much of the
budget should  be allocated  to the sector, or even  across  broad within  sector  categories  (such
as rural versus  urban  roads). They  are presented  with a set budget  for investment  in rural
roads, say, and must then choose what road projects  to do. This means  that there are ways of
choosing  projects  that allow  a more comprehensive  assessment  of the benefits,  but do not
claim  to measure  the social  rate of return.
A key difference  between  cost-benefit  analysis  (CB)  and cost-effectiveness
calculations  (CE) is that the latter work in a situation  where total expenditures  for a program
are fixed. In such a case,  one only  needs to decide  how to allocate  the budget  in the best
possible  way. There  is no need to use a consistent  metric  of benefits  that could  be the basis
for comparisons  with other  programs  or resource  uses. Nor is there a need for this benefits
indicator  to be expressed  in monetary  units or for it to be comparable  with other indicators.
The only  requirement  is to obtain  an outcome  indicator  per amount  spent. It is an indicator
specific  to the particular  program  and wouldn't  necessarily  be of interest  to any other
program. Thus, although  CB and CE both measure  benefits  to cost, the "benefit"  units are
different. To put the cost-effectiveness  indicator  in a broader  context would  require a
measure  of the social  value  of the project outcomes  in an opportunity  cost sense.
A number  of projects  in the World  Bank and elsewhere  have  turned to cost-
8effectiveness  calculations  to take account of a broader set of benefits-such as potential
health and education  benefits-yet get around the problem  of putting a monetary  value on
them. The method is sometimes  referred  to as multi-criteria  analysis  (Cook and Cook 1990).
It has typically  been used when traffic  volume is too low (< 50 vehicles  per day) for
conventional  consumer  surplus  measures  to make sense, yet, it is strongly  believed  that there
will  be important  social  benefits. In general,  a least-cost approach  is adopted. A threshold
level of costs is arbitrarily  designated  and project investments  costing  less are exempt from a
conventional  cost-benefit  analysis  that aims  to maximize  efficiency  alone. 2 The eligibility  of
sub-projects  is then subject  to "social  criteria" such as poverty  indicators  meeting  some pre-
determined  level. 3 In practice, the "social criteria"  are often no more than the number  of
population  in the zone of influence  per unit cost. In other cases,  potential subprojects  are
ranked  according  to indices  based on a series of variables  deemed  to identify  needier locations
(see, for example,  the Zambia  project, World Bank 1997).
If one accepts that the project as a whole must reach some minimum  internal  rate of
return (recognizing  that this is based on a partial  measure  of benefits)  then it is unclear why
one would only measure  this for sub-projects  above  some cost level.  There is no reason to
suppose  that the cheaper  projects (of which there may  be many)  would have the same
(conventionally  measured)  rate of return. So there could  well be a selection  bias in this
method. It would be better to estimate  the rate of return to a random  sample  of sub-projects.
A further concern  about  past "hybrid  methods"  is with the benefits  measure, which
2Recent  examples  include road projects in Peru, Zambia,  Andhra Pradesh, and China (World Bank 1995,
1997, 1998a and 1996 respectively).
For example, eligibility  under the social criteria for a project in Peru requires that IMRs  be over 80, the
index of unmet basic needs above 70 percent and beneficiaries  be more than 100  per kilometer (World Bank
1995).
9tends to be extremely  crude.  For example,  a priori,  there can be no assurance  that higher
population  served  per unit cost will  translate  into higher  benefits  from  a road investment.
Given identical  numbers  of potential  beneficiaries,  it is conceivable  that a higher  investment
cost due to worse terrain  could  produce  considerably  higher  benefits,  as a result  of resolving  a
worse access  problem. Furthermore,  it is not always  clear why some variable  is included  in
the benefit  index,  and even why  it is weighted  positively. For example,  lower literacy  is often
treated in this way. Yet, lower literacy  in an area might  instead  be taken as a positive  indicator
of need (in effect, a distributional  weight)  or a negative  indicator  of benefit,  assuming  that
those among  the poor who are literate  will  have  the highest  marginal  gains  from access  to a
road. A sharper  conceptual  distinction  is needed  between  the 'benefits' and how they are
weighted  to reflect  concerns  about distribution.
A final  concern  is that the process of determining  the variables  and their  weights
should  more fully  exploit  the knowledge  of local  experts  and of the poor themselves.
Transport  experts  can help  on technical  matters,  but are unlikely  to be the best people to
make the decisions  about  what information  should  be included  in making  a comprehensive
assessment  of the social  gains, and how that information  should  be aggregated.
104.  Assessing the Excluded Benefits from Rural Roads
Recognizing  that some potentially  important  benefits  arising  from rural road provision
and rehabilitation  do not get included  by conventional  methods  of measuring  benefits,  there
have been efforts to quantify  social  gains and add them to transport cost savings. 4 For
example,  in attributing  education  gains it has been assumed  that better road access  will
increase enrolments  by an amount  derived  from mean national  rates; previously  non-attending
children  are assumed  to complete  school, and their life-time  earnings  predicted  based on a
comparison  of earnings  for educated  and non-educated  individuals  nationally.  Total additional
earnings,  appropriately  reduced to take account of the costs of education,  are then added into
the road benefits  measure.
Such methods  require some strong assumptions. Implicitly,  road access  is treated as
the sole constraint  to children  attending  school.  Yet, there could  be a host of other
contributing  reasons that may  in turn, partly  explain  why that particular  road has not
previously  been built. Demand  for schooling  could  be low as a result of high local poverty
and the opportunity  cost of children's  time. Alternatively,  there may  be cultural  reasons
keeping  girls away, or the returns to education  may be perceived  to be low, or the quality  of
the school and teaching  may  be affecting  the schooling  decision.  Second, the assumption  that
when these children  join the labor  mnarket,  economic  conditions  will  be identical  and that
current earnings  differentials  will subsist  is also a strong one.
In attemnpting  to account for these difficult  to quantify  benefits,  it is not unconmnon  for
road project appraisals  and impact  evaluations  to draw on socio-economic  indicators  across
4 A recent example  is South Asia Region, Regional  Work Program Agreement: Socio-economic  impact of
rural access improvements,  with emphasis on social impact and poverty alleviation:  A regional study with
11geographic  entities  (villages,  regions),  delineated  by whether  or not they are serviced  by a
road, for evidence  of such benefits  and their magnitude.  This is part of the approach intended
for the research  effort mentioned  above  within  the cost-benefit  framework,  but this technique
is also used as evidence  in cost-effectiveness  calculations.  As is well  known from the
evaluation  literature,  however, drawing  policy  conclusions  from such statistics  can be
misleading  (for example,  Rosenzweig  et al. 1995). Box 2 illustrates  the biases that are
possible  using a simple  model  in which road placement  is endogenous,  and based in part on
the outcome indicator  used for assessing  impact.  By simply  comparing  outcomes in villages
with roads versus  those without,  the evaluator  can easily  conclude  that there are large benefits
when in fact there are none.
The general point here is that unless  road placement  is truly random-which seems
most unlikely-simple comparisons  of outcome indicators  in villages  with roads versus
without  them can be very deceptive. Using  such data as evidence  of benefits  without
accounting  for the process  by which  the road came to be built in a specific  location  may lead
to very deceptive  policy  conclusions  and decisions.  (Indeed,  there is nothing  preventing  a
health project from coming  along and replacing  the 'with and without  road' to a 'with and
without a health intervention,'  and attributing  the same income  gains  to the health policy.)
Bank-wide  applications",  May 14, 1999.
12Box 2: Deceptive assessments of the gains from rural roads
Table 1:  Mean incomes  in villages  with and without  a road ($/day/person)
Without  road  With  road  % increase
(n=56)  (n-44)  (t-test)
Case 1:  Road yields  1.287  2.413  87%
20% income  gain  (2.29)
Case 2: Road yields  1.287  1.976  54%
no income  gain  (2.00)
The table shows  mean  incomes  for a group of villages  that do not have  road
access  and a group  that does. Mean  income  is much higher  for the villages  with roads.
From such statistics  the conclusion  is sometimes  drawn  that the roads  generated  these
large gains-87  percent increase  in mean  income  for one group of villages  and 54
percent for the other in this particular  case.
However,  these  numbers  were created  by a model  in  which  roads generated  an
income  gain of only  20 percent for case 1, and no gain  for case 2. The model's pre-
intervention  incomes  were drawn  randomly  from log normal  distributions.  Road
placement  was determined  endogenously,  as a function  of village  income  (with 25
percent  weight)  and a second  independent  log-normal  random  variable  (75 percent).
The latter could represent  population  size,  ethnicity,  liely votes, historical  accident,  or
any other variable  influencing  road location  by the government. Thus,  roads are
distributed  across  villages  in terms of a latent variable  z = .25y + 0.75x  where  y is log
income  and x is the other determinant  of road  placement.  The model  gave a road only
to villages  with  positive  values  of z.
Of course,  the evaluator  does not know the true impact  of the roads and is tempted
to base an estimate  on the observed  differences  in mean  incomes  between  villages  with
a road and those without. This  yields  a large  over-estimate.
5.  How Relevant  is all  this to Poor Rural  Developing  Countries?
Many of the aforementioned limitations of conventional rural road investment
appraisal and selection apply directly to poor, largely rural developing economies. For one,
the assumptions underlying the "maximize efficiency"  goal are generally not plausible in such
settings. There tend to be few other re-distributive instruments such as a tax system.  Indeed,
we look to sectors such as rural infrastructure and roads to help achieve re-distributive
13objectives.  In addition,  it simply  cannot  be assumed  that investments  in rural roads will
automatically  be pro-poor.  Failure  to consider  the equity  objective  alongside  the efficiency
one will  thus bias sectoral investments  against  poorer areas and poor people.
Consumer  and producer  surplus  as conventionally  measured  appear to be inadequate
measures  of expected  benefits  in these settings. For example,  in countries  such as Viet Nam
and the other Asian transition  economies  it is particularly  difficult  to predict how agricultural
output will  alter or how traffic  levels  will  develop  given  how many  factors  can begin  to
change all at once. In many  areas, labor  and land  markets  will  be newly  developing  alongside
the road investment.  Roads  have  been  just one of many  constraints  to development.  We know
little about  how the rehabilitation  of a road link  interacted  with the other changes  in the
economy  will  eventually  alter traffic flows  and composition,  agricultural  and other sectoral
employment,  input and output markets. This may  well also be true in more static
economies-such as in Sub-Saharan  Africa-where, due to a series  of other  constraints,
effects  from the road may  not be reflected  in traffic  levels  or agricultural  productivity  for a
long time. On the other hand,  the argument  that there will  be substantial  pro-poor gains from
rural roads which are difficult  to measure  and to include  in conventional  CB analysis  also
holds for most of these  rural settings. For these  reasons,  working  within  the CE framework
and attempting  to refine  it, appears  to be the most appropriate,  as well  as promising,  means of
tackling  rural road appraisal.
In some countries,  assuring  minimum  access  to all nay be pro-poor since  it is likely
that the better-off are well-served  by past road investments. Further  expansion  will thus tend
to reach the poor. However,  this may  not necessarily  be the case in the poorest countries.
Viet  Nam is a case in point. The country  had negligible  investment  in infrastructure  for
14decades  coupled  with destructive  wars. The road stock remains  sparse and in severe disrepair.
There has clearly  been a tendency  to concentrate  first on rebuilding  higher  level  networks as
opposed to insuring  basic access  to isolated and poor communes. One would need a very
large budget to ensure a level  of 'minimum  access' to all and yet, the benefits  from any lesser
goal will  tend to be captured by better off areas. It is also necessary  to consider  that
providing  road access  to isolated,  poor commmnities  may  be far from a cost effective  use of
scarce resources for poverty  alleviation.  Thus, given  an objective  of raising  living  standards  in
a cost-effective  way, and given  the fixed  nature of most rural transport  projects-where  the
total allotted  budget for the project is almost  certainly  not sufficient  for ensuring  some defined
minimum  access  to all households-a  method  is still needed  for ranking  road projects that
takes into account  both equity and efficiency.
One response  to these problems  has been  to argue  that it is really of little consequence
in rural developing  econornies  because  inaccessibility  is an adequate  proxy for poverty. It is
also strongly  implied  that high  poverty areas have low economnic  potential.  Such convictions
underlie the rhetoric and justification  for current poverty focused  appraisal  approaches  to
rural road projects--whereby, typically,  a budget is set aside for non-economic  or 'social'
objectives,  not subjected  to ordinary  economic  analysis,  and projects are chosen so as to
maximize  the population  provided  with 'basic access' for a cost deemed acceptably  low.
Under this perspective,  the appropriateness  of a selection  formula  that aims  to identify  places
where poverty and economic  potential  are high and access  is low, is open to serious  doubts.
This paper argues that if one wants to use a transport intervention  to reduce poverty,
it seems important  to worry  about all three factors. Among  places where benefits  will  be
high, there are poor and non-poor places;  among  poor places there are ones where access is
15bad and ones where access  is already  good. A road will  not help the poor if they already have
good access. Alternatively,  in some poor and low access  places,  the costs far outweigh  the
potential benefits  from improved  access.  Other interventions- such as facilitating  out-
migration-wre more cost-effective  ways to reduce poverty.
Only data can help resolve  these conflicts.  For example,  data can throw light on the
argument  that the poor are concentrated  in areas where access  is bad and vice versa. If the
empirical  evidence  supports that view, one variable  can be dropped from the formula  used to
identify  appropriate  interventions.  A commune  level  data base covering  200 of Viet Nam's
communes  in six provinces  allows  an investigation  of these issues. 5
To illustrate  the proposed  methodology,  these data were used to create measures  of
poverty, inaccessibility  and economic  potential for each commune. Poverty is represented  by
an index that combines  the rate of infant  mortality,  the rate of malnutrition  for children  under
5, and the incidence  of hungry  households  in the commune. 6 Inaccessibility  takes into account
the existence  of passenger  and freight  transport services,  kilometers  of commune  roads per
area, access to different  levels  of road, railroads,  navigable  waterways  and whether a paved
all-weather,  or paved sometimes  impassable,  commune  level road runs through the commune.
Economic  potential  reflects population  density,  agricultural  potential  (here represented  by
irrigated  agricultural  land  per capita),  the number  of social and economnic  facilities,  human
capital (percent  of children  15 and under who have completed  primary  school) and number of
other development  programs. Each of the index  components  was attributed  points reflecting
5 See  van  de Walle  1999  for  a description  of the data-base--the  Survey  on Impact  of Rural  Roads  in  Viet  Nam
(SIRRV).
6 Hungry  households  are defined  nationally  as those with  the income  per  person  equivalent  of less  than 13  kg
of rice  per month.  This  is a popular  and  widely  collected  statistic  in Viet  Nan
16low, medium  or high valuesetermined  by the range of the data-for  a maximum  of 100
points for each index. One can certainly  quibble  both with the variables  included,  as well as
how they are aggregated.  Yet, the general conclusion  was not in the least altered  by sensitivity
tests changing  the combination  and aggregation  of the variables.
The communes  were ranked  according  to each of the three measures. Figure 1 plots
the commune  rankings  by inaccessibility  against  rankings  by poverty;  figure  2 does the same
for inaccessibility  and economic  potential;  and figure  3 does so for economic  potential  and
poverty.  As is readily seen, there is very little correlation  between  any of these rankings.
These data clearly  show that, in Viet Nam at least, one cannot simply  reduce the
choice to places with poor access,  or high poverty,  or economic  potential. It will be important
to figure  out how to combine  and weight  these factors  so as to select the places  where roads
will have  the greatest impact  on poverty given  the cost. Clearly,  there are places where
inaccessibility,  poverty  and economic  potential  are all high, identified  by the north-east
quadrant in each figure.  Project selection  needs to be able to identify  the intersection  of the
three. This is where returns to road investments  will  be highest.  Of course, even among  these
places farther choices  will  exist but they will  matter  much less.
'76.  The Appraisal  Problem  Revisited
Let us assume  initially  that a fixed  budget is available  for raising  living  standards
through the rehabilitation  of rural road links. How should  the budget  be allocated? In
answering  this question,  one must consider  the allocation  between  regional  entities,  such as
province, district and commune. And one must consider  geographical  coverage within  each
of these levels. In making  these choices  one wants to assure a cost-effective  use of resources,
given  the overall objective  of reducing  poverty.
A number  of issues  arise  in addressing  this appraisal  problem. First, how can we
measure  expected  benefits? This raises the issue of how to account for factors  which can be
expected  to influence  the benefit stream,  and also attaching  some value  on those factors  to
allow a ranking  of all potential  investment  projects. Various  transport and existing  road
attributes  (e.g., road density  in the area), as well  as commune  and population  characteristics
(e.g., human  resource development;  presence  of development  projects and complementary
infrastructure)  will  clearly  influence  the social  returns from an investment.  But they are likely
to do so in differing  degrees.' This suggests  that some kind of weighting  scheme  rmust  be
designed  to reflect  each factor's significance.  How are such weights to be determined?
Another distinct issue  concerns  how distributional  goals are to be incorporated. All
else equal,  preference  should  clearly  be given  to poorer beneficiaries  of the transport facilities.
This brings up first the question  of how "poverty"  should be measured.  In practice, data
availability  and comparability  across the potential  roads' zones of influence,  is likely  to be the
decisive  factor. A second issue to be decided  relates to what tradeoffs  will  be accepted
7 Numerous studies have remarked on the key role of complimentary  inputs and mediating variables  in
explaining  the gains from a rural road investment. For example, see Hine (1982) and Cook and Cook (1990).
18between  reaching  the poor and other objectives,  such as traffic  volume.
A final  question  concerns  the ability  to centrally  appraise  all  potential  road links-  that
could run to tens of thousands-individually. Is it acceptable  to rely  on a limited  number  of
"representative"  road link  appraisals  and to extrapolate  to other areas? Do alternatives  to this
common  solution  exist?
On top of these concerns,  there is no guarantee  that the initial  budget  allocation  was
optimal. Is too much  or too little  being  allocated  to the sector  as a whole?
The following  section  proposes  one approach  to resolving  these issues,  within  realistic
information  constraints.
7.  The Proposed  Approach
A total budget C is available  for road rehabilitation  investments.  It is assumed  that
there are many  road links  that are potential  candidates  for the project and that C is not
sufficient  to fund  them all. The  task of the appraisal  is to provide  a ranking  among  these
potential  links  by defining  a selection  fonnula  that identifies  places  where  poverty and
economic  potential  are high and accessibility  is poor. Ultimately,  we want a ranking  formula
that can reflect  tradeoffs  between  these  variables  and still  be implementable.
It is assumed that each road link has a set of encompassing communities (EC) and that
benefits  are confined  to those cormmunities.  Although  this is unlikely  to be the ideal way to
define  a road's zone of influence,  it reflects  a pragmatic  attempt  to resolve  the data collection
problem.  The approach  takes advantage  of the fact that data is often,  and/or  more easily,
collected at the community level. For data reasons too, inequality within the EC is
ignored-all those within  a given  EC are treated  the same  way. Road links  here refer to any
*19type of road-whether  provincial  (state), district or commnune.
The benefit  to a typical  user of a proposed link  is estimated  from data on existing
physical  infrastructure,  human  development,  economic  potential  of the region  and other
factors  that may influence  the marginal  gains from a road investment.  One could then
calculate  total benefit (multiplying  by the number  of people in the EC) and hence the benefit
to cost ratio for the link. However,  this treats different  users in different  EC's the same  way,
and so does not reflect  equity concerns. Instead  we want to give higher  weight  to poor users.
This is done by attaching  a social  weight  to each  EC, reflecting  how poor residents  are on
average.  Thus a socially  weighted  benefit-cost  ratio is created.
Social welfare  (SW)  is defined  as IS1BiNi, where Si is the social (equity)  value attached
to a typical  user of the i'th link,  taken to be the average  person living  in its EC; Bi denotes the
efficiency  benefit per person for the i'th link;  and Ni is the number  of people  in the ECs of the
i'th link. Also let C, denote the total cost of rehabilitating  the i'th link (cost per unit length
times length).
The problem  is then to maximize  SW  subject  to YCi = C. To find the best allocation,
all potential  road links should  first be ranked  by the benefit-to-cost  ratio: SiB,N/Ci. (If Bi = B
for all i, then the ranking  is simnply  done by S,N,/Ci).  Arbitrary  thresholds  for different  types of
roads, or for amounts  set aside for the poor, are not required.  The same criteria  are used for
all road links.
If a minimum  pecuniary  rate of return is also stipulated  then this is a further constraint
that must be satisfied.  If the minimum  rate of return condition  is not satisfied  then one finds
the feasible  project composition  which achieves  that rate of return at maximum  SW,  or one
spends  less than the initial  budget. If the constraint  is satisfied  then that suggests  a case for
20expanding  the initial  budget. However,  it is essential  that the stipulated  minimum  pecuniary
rate of return factors  in the existence  of non-pecuniary  benefits.  I will  return  to this point.
Benefits and equity weights: The measure of benefit for the i'th road link (B;) is
derived  from the values  of a series  of variables  Xi which  help determine  the average  benefit
that can be derived  from the road investment  within  the link's  ECs. These  include  attributes
of the road and attributes  of the people served. Some  factors  may  lessen  benefits,  some may
increase  the stream  of benefits. Careful  thought  needs to go into ensuring  that relevant
variables  are accounted  for as much  as possible. However,  what is considered  will  ultimately
depend  on what can  be measured  at the encompassing  community  level.  Certain  factors  will
be of more  consequence  to the road benefits,  as well  as to overall  project objectives,  than
others. For example,  we rnay  want to put a higher  weight  on connectivity  to the existing
network  than to the state of the existing  road. Hence  a system  of weights  (w,)  needs to be
established  which  reflects  the relative  importance  of each  variable  in X in the determination  of
eventual benefits.  So Bi = XjwjXy  where Xwj = 1. For each link i, the weighted values of the
Xs are then added  up to get a measure  of the total expected  benefit  from  the road link. This
should  then be expressed  on a per capita  basis.
In a similar  fashion,  we can  postulate that the social  weights Si  are a weighted  sum of
the values  taken by a vector of measurable  variables  Z 1 describing  the socio-econornic
conditions  in the EC of the i'th road link.  The poorer the average  person  in an EC, the higher
the value of S. Thus, Si  = YkVkZik  where  vk is the weight  attached  to the k'th factor deemed
relevant  to the overall  social  weight,  where  Xvk  =  1.
An important  issue  is the scaling  of B and S, since  this determines  the overall
importance  attached  to equity  versus  efficiency  (as measured  by the Bs). This is a value
21judgement.  One way to decide  the issue is to fix the ratio of the maximum  B to the minimum
B and similarly  for the Ss. B, can be normalized  to vary between  zero and 100, say. Similarly
the minimum  S (for the least poor EC) can be set to zero. The decision  on the maximum  S
(for the poorest EC) then determines  the relative  weight  attributed  to equity  versus efficiency
by the formula.
Finally,  the resulting  measure  of benefits  is divided  by the estimated  costs to give a
benefit to cost ratio.  The costs will  vary according  to the type of road being  rehabilitated  and
the planned  work. The ratios are then used to rank all road link  investment  proposals. The
first disbursement  from the budget  goes to the link with the highest  benefit-cost  ratio. The
next disbursement  goes to the next highest  ratio, and so on till the budget is exhausted.
Minimum rates of return:  Given valuation  problems,  and since  these are worse for
certain  projects, a key implication  is that it cannot be optimal  to insist that all projects achieve
the same  rate of return as required  for a public investment  with known (measured)  benefits.
Under the approach  common  in current  practices  in the sector, a project must either achieve  a
certain  return or it is taken completely  outside  the normal  evaluation  system.  In reality,  for all
projects we should  be able to measure  some benefits  reasonably  straightforwardly  and some
not. Instead  of putting certain  projects outside  the evaluation  process, it would be better to
explicitly  allow  for the valuation  problems  and ensure that all investments  achieve  a certain
minimum  rate of return in the measurables.  This approach  would need  to rely  on estimates  of
average non-pecuniary  benefits  for a broad class of projects  probably  drawing  on evidence  in
other settings. Proper, careful  evaluation  based on the latest evaluation  best practice, that
allows for endogenous  placement  and, where possible,  uses experimental  methods,  must be
undertaken to arrive at benchmark  rates of return for different  classes  of projects. Once we
22have an idea of the magnitude  of average  non-pecuniary  benefits  and hence internal  rates of
return from the investments,  we can set the measurable  rate of return cutoff  points.
Recognizing  our lack of knowledge  in this area will add impetus  towards resolving  the issue
in a believable  way taking proper account of biases such as due to the endogeneity  of program
placement  (as discussed  above). This means  setting  up focused and rigorous research
projects that aim to cover enough  project types to provide  an idea on various non-pecuniary
benefits.
There are a number  ofjudgements that will  need to be made  to implement  the above
approach,  notably in setting  the various weights (including  the overall  weight  on equity versus
efficiency). The next section  will suggest how well-informed  judgements,  consistent  with
social values  in each setting, might  be formed  in practice.
8.  Putting the Approach  into Practices
The following  gives a step by step example  of possible implementation  in Viet Nam.
Obviously,  it is important  to be flexible  and allow  for institutional  and other local constraints
in implementation.  The approach  needs to be piloted,  revised  after a first cycle and altered  in
the light of experience.  All players  must be willing  to accept set-up costs including  the time
necessary  for data collection  and analysis,  and for all  project proposals  to be made.
A fixed  budget is available  for the rehabilitation  of rural road links. All provinces
(covered  by the project) compete  for this budget. The specific  variables  and their weights are
devised  by the project team in collaboration  with the government.  The idea is to then
8  This section elaborates on an actual example  from a recent World  Barnk  project.  Some  points have been
developed further than in the project for expository reasons.
23decentralize  the formula  to the provinces  that will  be responsible  for making  proposals and bid
for the money.  The steps are as follows:
Step 1: Availability  of data at the commune/district  level and an extensive  consultative
process allows the Bank and the transport  ministry  teams to delineate  a set of
Xs-encompassing commune  and road characteristics-that must be taken into account in
estimating  expected  efficiency  benefits. 9 A potential  list of the variables  that determine
efficiency  gains might include  the following:
Road density  in area; Local human  resource  development:  as measured,  say, by percent
of children  completing  primary  school;  Other (complementary)  development  projects in
area; Accessibility  to social  service  facilities;  Accessibility  to other forms of transport
(train,  waterways);  Agricultural  development  potential as measured,  say, by unused land
with agricultural  potential;  Current  road condition;  Linkages  with the existing  network
of roads.
Step 2: Next the scale and key variables  determining  the imputed social  value of the
benefits  from a link  must be determined.  From the point of view of the project objectives,  the
poverty level is an important  characteristic  of ECs. Ideally,  poverty  data by commune  would
be available  centrally.  Data often  exist at comunune  or district level  but there is no system to
compile  it nationally. One possibility  is to rely  on the provinces  to come up with an internal
poverty  ranking  of their communes  based on a composite  index  of variables  (Z) influencing  Si,
the content and scale  of which is decided  centrally. For example,  this could include  IMRs,
average incomes,  literacy,  share of school-age  children  attending  secondary  school, under-
nutrition, etc. Since  such indicators  are typically  expressed  in different  units, a different  scale
9A number of variables  that help determine  the efficiency  gains might also enter the equity weights, possibly
with the opposite sign! For example, there is evidence  of significant  complementarities  between physical and
human infrastructure investments  (for example, van de Walle 2000). Thus, it is likely  that the marginal
benefits  from a road project will  be higher in areas where education  and health status are higher. On the other
hand, one might want to favor ECs with lower human capital, and hence welfare, with a higher distributional
weight.
24must be determined  so that the numbers  can be added  up (note  that this applies  also to the
Xs). Most conimunes  report such data to the district.  The  province  authorities  should  then be
able  to collect  the informnation  from each  of their districts.
Step 3: To determine  the weights  on the variables  in B and S, and the value  of the
scale for the poorest EC relative  to the least poor and hence  the scaling  of equity  versus
efficiency  concerns,  a multi-disciplinary  group of Government  and non-government
Vietnamese  experts  can  be set up to define  the weights  by consultative  process. The Bank
team can design  and participate  in a meeting  to do this. Possibly  separate  meetings  will  be
needed  for S and B. By relying  on a comrnission  of local experts,  it is expected  that the
measurement  of benefits  will  adequately  reflect  societal  values.
Step 4: A technical  assistance  team should  be provided  to each province  for a certain
amount of time to explain  the rules of the game,  help  make  project plans, comnnent  on the
shelf of possible  projects,  etc. It will also explain  that validation  checks  will  be made.
Step 5: All provinces  produce proposals.  The methodology  is applied  to all types of
roads. The provinces  must carefully  weigh  the costs of spot repairs,  versus  rehabilitation,
versus  full  upgrading  in making  their proposals.  Each  province  draws  up a list of benefits  and
costs for all road links  put forward  as potential  sub-projects.  The process should  allow  for
proposals  that include  more  than one road link,  and possibly  combinations  of different  levels
of road links. For example,  a benefit-to-cost  ratio calculation  could  be based on a network of
2 or more  contiguous  links  where it is persuasively  argued  that the benefits  from one link  are
considerably  higher  if the other link  is also rehabilitated.  The technical  team will  be
responsible  for explaining  this and extending  assistance  to the provincial  teams.
Step 6: Since  the formula  is fully  decentralized  it would  be desirable  to introduce
25incentives  to play according  to the rules. Validation  of the province  assessments  of numbers
can be made on a random  basis.  A province  that is found  to have  cheated  is punished.
Punishment  can consist of being  thrown out of the game,  or face some  appropriate  penalty
such as a tax on its costs.
Step 7: The money  is allocated  to provinces  according  to the lists.  The first unit of
money  goes to the highest  benefit  for cost "sub-project";  the second to the next and so on.
One potential  issue is that of the cross-province  funding  distribution.  It is conceivable  that the
best projects  will  be concentrated  in a few provinces. If this is a concern  there are a number
of ways to prevent this eventuality. It might  be specified  that the second  pot of money  must
go to a different  province  from the first,  and so forth, to avoid  all the money  ending  up in only
a few places.  Or it may  be decided  that each  province  originally  selected  to participate  must
get a minimum  of the total, (say 1/6Oih  in the case where 30 provinces  are participating).
Alternatively,  a formula  could  be determined  by which  one half  of the entire  budget is
allocated  in proportion  to province  population  size,  or population  and a provincial  index  of
inaccessibility  and poverty,  leaving  the rest to be allocated  according  to where the most cost-
effective  links are proposed.  Either way,  the money  is still  allocated  according  to the lists of
rankings. If the minimum  allocation  has been reached  for each  province,  we stop. If not, then
we will  need  to go back to the list and go through a process whereby  the last chosen link  is
dropped and (unless  it is located  in the under-funded  province)  replaced  by the link  with the
highest  cost/benefit  ratio from  the under-funded  province,  and so on.
Step 8: For a representative  project within  each of the main  road types, a conventional
internal  rate of return calculation  is made based on producer  and consumer  surpluses. This is
used to estimate  the overall  rate of return to the set of sub-projects  selected  up to Step 7. A
26minimum  return that is adjusted  for expected  non-pecuniary  benefit  levels  is determined. If
the average  rate of return  is at or above  the minimum  then one stops. If, however,  it is below
the minimum,  then one has to substitute  projects  that had not previously  been included  for
some  that had. Thus substitution  should  be made  so as to assure  the least  cost in terms  of the
more comprehensive  measure  of benefits  used in selecting  projects.  The  project with the
lowest benefit-cost  ratio in the road type category  with the lowest  rate of return should  be
dropped and replaced  by the project with the highest  ratio amongst  those previously  rejected.
This continues  until the minimum  rate of return is reached.
9.  Concluding  Comments
The approach  proposed  here builds  on a number  of past approaches,  observations  and
project experience.  The aim  has been  to focus the discussion  back squarely  on the poverty
objective,  but doing so within  a public  economics  framework  in which  efficiency  and equity
concerns  are inseparable,  information  is incomplete  in important  ways,  and resources  are
limited.  The approach  tries to avoid  the tendency  to treat budgets for so-called  'social
objectives'  outside  the realn of hard-nosed  economic  analysis,  but also recognizing  the
constraints  faced in practice  in implementing  rigorous  appraisal  with limited  information.
The advantages  of proceeding  as outlined  in this proposal  include  that it holds the
hope of building  capacity,  and is participatory;  it extracts local  information  that may  not be
readily  available  to the center;  and it appears  to be feasible  through its reliance  on the
participation  of local authorities  in the appraisal  of sub-projects.  The method  promises  to
assume  that the most effective  investments  are selected  from  the point  of view of poverty
reduction,  given  both the information  and resource  constraints.
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